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Summary Findings
A number of trends are changing the nature of social risks and increase the
importance of human capital, adaptability and flexibility. This paper discusses
the usefulness of a life-course perspective in developing proactive social policies
that better fit the changing life cycles of individuals who combine formal work
with other activities on transitional labor markets. It pays special attention to
the accumulation and maintenance of human capital over the life course and
stresses that reconciliation of work and family goes beyond child-care facilities
and parental leave, and involves the entire life course. In particular, longer and
deeper involvement in paid employment allows people to exploit their longer
life to reconcile the two ambitions of, first, investing in the next generation as
a parent and, second, pursuing a fulfilling career in paid work in which one
keeps learning. Greater flexibility of working time over the life course requires
more individual responsibility for financing leave. Moreover, rather than
shielding older insiders through employment protection, labor-market institutions
should enable parents of young children to easily enter and remain in the labor
market. Finally, more activating social assistance and in-work benefits should
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The Life-Course Perspective and Social Policies: An Issues Note






A number of trends are changing the nature of social risks and increase the importance of 
human capital, adaptability and flexibility. This paper discusses the usefulness of a life-
course perspective in developing proactive social policies that better fit the changing life 
cycles of individuals who combine formal work with other activities on transitional labor 
markets. It pays special attention to the accumulation and maintenance of human capital over 
the life course and stresses that reconciliation of work and family goes beyond child-care 
facilities and parental leave, and involves the entire life course. In particular, longer and 
deeper involvement in paid employment allows people to exploit their longer life to reconcile 
the two ambitions of, first, investing in the next generation as a parent and, second, pursuing 
a fulfilling career in paid work in which one keeps learning. Greater flexibility of working 
time over the life course requires more individual responsibility for financing leave. 
Moreover, rather than shielding older insiders through employment protection, labor-market 
institutions should enable parents of young children to easily enter and remain in the labor 
market. Finally, more activating social assistance and in-work benefits should replace the 
passive income support for breadwinners that results in high minimum-wage floors.  
 
Keywords: life course, human capital, work and family, labor market, retirement, 
employment protection. 
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I Introduction 
 
Life courses are becoming more heterogeneous in terms of the distribution of time over 
working, caring, learning and resting. As a consequence of the feminization of work, workers 
increasingly combine a career in the formal labor market with family obligations.  Moreover, 
in transitional labor markets, workers move between periods of full-time work to periods of 
voluntary (part-time) absence from the labor market to enjoy leisure, educate themselves, set 
up a business, or care for children or frail relatives.  
These developments are changing the nature of social risks at a time when traditional 
institutions for insuring social risks are under pressure. In particular, firms can offer less job 
security to their employees in a dynamic economy with constant innovation and creative 
destruction. At the same time, governments find that insuring human capital through ex-post 
income replacements becomes increasingly costly in terms of harming the incentives to 
accumulate and maintain that capital.   
This paper discusses the usefulness of a life-course perspective in developing 
proactive approaches to social policy that better fit the changing nature of social risks over 
the life cycle. We pay special attention to the accumulation and maintenance of human 
capital over the life course as well as reconciliation of work and family. Human capital 
becomes more and more the key to personal fulfillment, stable personal relationships and 
social inclusion on a micro level, and to high levels of employment and labor productivity on 
a macro level. Human capital is produced not only in schools but also in families and firms. 
Reconciliation of work (including workplace learning in firms) and family (including 
informal care for young children) is therefore essential for safeguarding durable labor supply 
and an adaptable labor force generating substantial productivity growth.  
The main contribution of this paper is to offer a holistic life-course perspective for 
exploring various complementarities between social and economic policies that are typically 
investigated in isolation. To illustrate, this paper points out that the reconciliation of work 
and family goes beyond child-care facilities and parental leave during the family phase, and 
involves the entire life course. Since the paper focuses on the interactions and 
complementarities between various policies, it cannot deal in great depth with each separate 
policy area and has to refer to the literature for a more elaborate detailed analysis.     4 
Section 2 considers a number of trends that are changing the nature of social risks and 
call for a life-course perspective. These trends point to an increased importance of human 
capital, adaptability and flexibility. Section 2 also considers a number of challenges that 
endanger the level and quality of human capital at a time when corporations and governments 
are withdrawing from their traditional roles as insurers of human-capital risks. To investigate 
the role of social policy, section 3 investigates the market and institutional failures that 
damage human capital accumulation and hamper flexibility and adaptability over the life 
cycle. Traditional social policies, such as compressed wage scales and job protection, are 
becoming increasingly counterproductive in generating security. This calls for institutional 
innovation in developing new proactive approaches to social protection over the life cycle. 
Section 4 employs the life-course perspective to describe various elements of such 
approaches. Section 5 concludes by focusing on the political economy of reform.  
  5 




This subsection considers a number of trends that are changing the nature of social risks and 
call for a life-course perspective, such as increased female labor-force participation, a higher 
skill premium signaling more scarcity of human capital, increased longevity, and a greater 
importance of non-cognitive skills shaped early in life. These trends point to the increased 
importance of human capital, adaptability and flexibility.  
 
Female human capital stronger  
Female labor force participation has increased strongly in almost all OECD countries over 
the last few decades (see Figure 2.1). A major factor is the increased supply of female human 
capital as a result of better-educated women, improved birth control, better household 
appliances, and changing female aspirations (see Golden and Katz (2002)). At the same time, 
increasing employment shares of the service sector and technological developments have 
boosted the demand for female labor by facilitating part-time work and by raising the 
demand for communication and creative skills at the expense of raw muscle power in the 
industrial sector (see Golden (2006)). The increased potential earnings of women in the 
formal labor market reduce the scope for specialization in home production between male 
and female partners and encourage more gender equality (see Jones et al. (2003)). As a direct 
consequence, both male and female employees combine a career in the formal labor market 
with family obligations (see Table 2.1). About half of the working European workforce 
combines paid work with unpaid work of at least 12 hours a week (see Groot and Breedveld 
(2004)). Moreover, life courses become increasingly heterogeneous in terms of the 
distribution of time over working, caring, learning and resting, as people are more and more 
able to construct their own choice biographies (see European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2003)).  
  Large cross-country differences in the levels of female participation exist, especially 
for low-skilled women. Whereas participation ratios of high-skilled women (with tertiary 
education) exceed 75 percent in all EU countries, participation ratios of low-skilled women  6 
(with less than upper secondary education) vary substantially from above 50 percent in 
Nordic countries and France to close to 35 percent in Southern and Eastern Europe (see 
Figure 2.2).
3 Although the presence of young children depresses the participation rates of 
women, employment rates of both mothers with young children and other women rise 
strongly with the educational level, even though high-skilled mothers opt for part-time work 
much more often than their childless peers (see Table 2.2). Indeed, highly educated women 
appear to combine work and family by reducing their working time rather than by exiting 
employment, thus remaining in touch with the labor market. These data bear out the close 
complementarity between human capital (as measured by the level of education), on the one 
hand, and the employment level, on the other hand.   
 
Human capital more important 
The importance of the educational level as a crucial determinant of female labor participation 
points to human capital as the key to a successful career in a modern knowledge-intensive 
economy. Indeed, several studies indicate that the skill premium has increased as human 
capital has become scarcer (see Autor and Katz (1999)). The additional demand for skills on 
account of rapid technological change outstrips the additional supply of skills as a result of a 
better-educated workforce.  
  At the same time, work and career are increasingly important for personal fulfillment 
and development, life-long learning, the maintenance of social networks and (mental and 
physical) health. This holds true not only for men but also increasingly for women. Indeed, 
well-educated women aspire to the independence and fulfillment that paid employment 
brings. Access to employment, and thus workplace learning, prevents not only social 
exclusion but also depreciation of skills as a result of rapid technological change.     
 
Longer life and rapid innovation call for life-long learning   
Increased longevity implies that human capital has become more durable. Average life 
expectancy at birth has increased by about 2 ½ years per decennium since 1950 in the OECD 
                                                           
3 Portugal is an exception in Southern Europe. These participation ratios are based on participation in the formal 
sector and thus do not include the participation of low-skilled women in the informal, grey economy (for 
example, by providing cleaning services).    7 
countries. Life expectancy at age 65, which is more relevant for the costs of pensions, rose by 
on average one year per decennium (Figure 2.3). At the same time, knowledge and specific 
skills age fast on account of creative destruction associated with fierce competition and rapid 
innovation. The combination of a longer life combined with rapid obsolescence of skills and 
the increased importance of human capital stimulate workers to engage in life-long learning.  
 
An adaptable labor force enhances the legitimacy of competition     
Also the creative destruction associated with a competitive, innovative economy requires 
greater adaptability and employability of the workforce to prevent a competitive market 
economy from losing its social legitimacy. By absorbing the idiosyncratic shocks associated 
with creative destruction, an entrepreneurial workforce empowered with sufficient skills 
safeguards the legitimacy of a dynamic market, thereby boosting productivity growth. 
Moreover, an adaptable labor force can embrace risk, thereby raising the supply of risk-
taking capital for additional R&D and risk-taking entrepreneurs who experiment and 
challenge existing firms. More generally, in a continuously changing and highly competitive 
environment of a modern economy, intellectual flexibility, emotional resilience and the 
capacity to work well with others are at a premium.   
 
Non-cognitive skills are becoming more important and are shaped early in life         
Adaptability and the ability to learn are important components of human capital. The same 
holds true for non-cognitive skills (such as social and communication skills facilitating stable 
relationships, self-discipline, self-control and self-esteem, perseverance and other virtues, 
emotional security, time preference, motivation to learn, openness to change) and values 
stressing creativity, personal growth, responsibility, and readiness to meet challenges. These 
skills and values, which enhance adaptability and the ability to learn throughout the adult life, 
are shaped early in life, mainly in families.
4 Early child development therefore gains in 
importance in accumulating key skills for successful careers in paid work and stable, 
supportive personal relationships in two-parent families easing the stresses of life (see CEA 
(1997)). In order to lay the basis for life-long learning through child development in families,  8 
while at the same time maintaining the marketable skills of parents, workers should be able 
to reconcile work with family obligations. Indeed, work is important to maintain skills 
because an important part of skill formation occurs on the work floor through on-the-job 
training.   
 
Aging makes human capital more valuable 
Aging raises the importance of human capital. More funding of pensions raise capital-labor 
ratios, thereby depressing returns around the world and at the same time raise wages (see 
Boersch-Supan (2003), Aglietta et al. (2003)). Moreover, if commodities and services are not 
perfectly tradable, shifts in the real exchange rate and real wages imply that the return on 
pension saving fall – even in a small open economy that is perfectly integrated in world 
financial markets. Intuitively, as the older, inactive generations become larger in number 
compared to the active working generation, a tight labor market raises real wages, thereby 
depressing the real value of the capital that the older generations have accumulated (see 
Knaap (2005)). Aging thus makes human capital more valuable. Accordingly, investment in 
human capital becomes more attractive compared to that in other capital. Aging thus 
increases the need to not only save more in the form of financial capital but also invest more 
in human capital. In particular, high levels of human capital and employment ensure that the 
additional financial savings that result from more funding do not result in low rates of return. 
 
2.2 Challenges  
 
This subsection identifies several challenges in the face of the trends described above. These 
challenges include maintaining the intergenerational contract, stopping the vicious circle of 
early retirement and rapid depreciation of human capital, protecting investments in the 
human capital of the young, insuring human capital while at the same time providing 
incentives to accumulate and maintain human capital, empowering workers to become less 
dependent on the firm they work for, and protecting social cohesion by empowering 
disadvantaged groups.    
                                                                                                                                                                                    
4 See Heckman (2000) and Cunha et al. (2005) for the theory and evidence on human-capital formation over the  9 
 
Maintaining the intergenerational contract  
A first challenge is to maintain social cohesion in the face of a population that is aging on 
account of increased longevity and declining fertility. In particular, aging threatens the 
intergenerational contract according to which each generation invests in the human capital of 
the next and is taken care of at the end of its life by the generations in which it has invested. 
Hence, each generation cares twice (once for the previous and once for the next generation) 
and is taken care of twice (as a child and in old age). Within a family context, women are the 
traditional brokers of the intergenerational contract, providing most of the informal care to 
children and aged relatives.
5 The higher potential earnings of women in the formal labor 
market have increased the opportunity costs of these activities at a time when most elderly 
have fewer younger relatives who can care for them as a result of shrinking family size. 
Moreover, the middle aged face a heavy tax burden as the large baby-boom generation starts 
to take advantage of pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pensions and health care provisions. This 
threatens the sustainability of the public intergenerational contract according to which the 
middle-aged must care not only for the very old but also for the very young.     
 
Stopping the vicious circle of early retirement and rapid depreciation of human capital  
The so-called work-age paradox exacerbates this threat. Whereas life expectancy increases 
and people enjoy better health at 65 years of age than ever before in history, the effective 
retirement age, in Europe especially, has fallen substantially below 65. Biological aging and 
social aging have thus moved in the opposite direction. As a direct consequence, the expected 
retirement span has increased substantially while the working life is being compressed. 
Indeed, many OECD countries depreciate their human capital quickly. Across the OECD, the 
number of years that men can expect to spend in retirement has increased from an average of 
11 years in 1970 to 18 years in 2004. For women, the corresponding numbers are 14 and 23 
years (see Figure 2.4).   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
life cycle and the key role of the family as the producer of skills 
5 Time surveys indicate that women in couples still provide the bulk of informal care and work within the 
household (see Table 2.1). Even women in full-time work spend about twice as much time on these activities as 
their male partners do.(see also OECD (2001a)). Women older than 50 provide a lot of informal care to aged 
relatives.   10 
 
Maintaining investments in younger generations 
With increased longevity, earlier retirement and the compression of the working life, the 
aging European continent risks becoming entangled in a vicious circle of early retirement and 
lower fertility in which politically strong older generations favor generous passive spending 
on pensions and health care at the expense of investments in the human capital of younger 
generations. The decline in fertility in various European countries implies that current 
generations are investing less in future generations (see Table 2.3).
6 The opportunity costs of 
raising children in terms of foregone career possibilities seem excessive for many high-
skilled women, who opt for a career in paid work rather than raising children.
7 Low-skilled 
women, in contrast, make the opposite choice. Indeed, highly educated women feature the 
lowest fertility rates, while more than a quarter of high-skilled women remain childless (see 
Schoenmaeckers and Lodewijckx (1999)). Moreover, countries featuring the largest increases 
in female participation rates tend to show relatively large declines in fertility rates (see Chart 
4.1 in OECD 2001a)). The low fertility rates of high-skilled women have adverse 
consequences for the future quality of human capital, because the skill level of children tends 
to be closely related to that of their parents (see Plug en Vijverberg (2003)).  
Families face difficulties in reconciling work with rearing children. In particular, the 
Employment Options of the Future (EOF) survey carried out in 1998 in EU member states 
shows that many couples with children under the age of six prefer to work shorter hours, 
even taking into account the need to earn a living (see Table 2.4). About half of the working 
population in the EU would prefer to reduce their working hours with a corresponding cut in 
pay (see EFILWC (2003)). Moreover, European women would like to bear more children 
                                                           
6 Actual fertility levels are not a good measure of the true level of fertility because they are sensitive to changes 
in the timing of births. Also completed fertility, which measures the average numbers of live births at the end of 
the childbearing years, indicates that fertility has dropped below replacement levels in almost all European 
countries (see Schoenmaeckers and Lodewijckx (1999)).  
7 Recent research shows that the gender gap in wages is to a large extent a ‘family gap.’ In the United Kingdom, 
for example, the gender wage gap (that cannot be explained by other observable factors) for men and women 
without children is 10 percent, but increases to more than 30 percent for those with children and stays at 25 
percent for those whose children have grown up (see Paull (2006)). Similar consequences of motherhood are 
found for hours worked, with little shrinking of the work gap when children have grown up. Rather than a time 
when many mothers return to work, school entry of the child is in fact a time of high labor-market turnover -- 
with mothers both moving into and out of work and changing their working patterns. Indeed, substantial gender  11 
than they actually have. In some countries, the difference between desired and actual number 
of children is as large as –0.7 (see Schoenmaeckers and Lodewijckx (1999)). When 
considering options for combining work with other activities, European workers consider 
flexible working times and time-bank arrangements to save overtime as the most promising 
options (see Table 2.5).   
  
Insuring human capital while protecting the incentives to maintain human capital  Various 
developments increase the dangers of moral hazard and hence make human-capital risks less 
insurable. As the economy shifts from blue-collar work in industrial sectors to white-collar 
work in service sectors and knowledge-intensive activities, mental causes of sickness and 
disability become more prominent. These types of sickness and disability can be less easily 
verified than physical disabilities. Moreover, an increasing number of workers now moves 
between periods of full-time work to periods of voluntary absence from the labor market to 
enjoy leisure, educate themselves, set up a business, or care for children or frail relatives. In 
such a transitional labor market with a growing diversity of life courses, it becomes more 
difficult to separate voluntary periods of inactivity from involuntary unemployment. At the 
same time, individuals can increasingly affect the probability that they become unemployed 
or sick by investing in their own employability or by the way in which they organize their 
life. In other words, the dividing line blurs between the contingencies that people are 
responsible for (the so-called manufactured or voluntary risks) and those for which they are 
not (the so-called external risks). More and more periods in which people experience a cut in 
income are in part ‘manufactured,’ increasing the risk of moral hazard in social insurances 
that protect people against these losses in income.  
These changes in the nature of and the responsibility for social risks make it more 
costly to insure human capital through ex-post income replacements in terms of harming the 
incentives to accumulate and maintain that capital. At the same time, a more dynamic world 
economy and a decline of the extended family as an insurance device have increased the 
demand for such insurance as people experience more substantial economic insecurity.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
wage and work gaps persist 30 years after birth. Motherhood thus substantially harms the human capital of  12 
Empowering workers to become less dependent on corporations 
Also corporations can offer people less job security. Fewer and fewer employees work for 40 
years for the same company. More intense competition implies that companies exhibit 
shorter life spans. In a dynamic economy, constant innovation results in substantial creative 
destruction. Firms can thus offer less security to their employees. Within firms, employees 
have to update knowledge and qualifications regularly as they move between different jobs 
on the internal labor market. These developments point again to the importance of 
continuously maintaining and updating skills in order to guarantee income security. Making 
workers less dependent on their employer requires more employable workers through more 
general human capital.  
 
Protecting social cohesion  
The labor-market position of unskilled workers (including many unskilled migrants) weakens 
as a result of technological and other developments. Together with the relatively high 
minimum-wage floors in European labor markets, this produces structural unemployment 
yielding social exclusion of the unskilled. These minimum-wage floors are compatible with 
high levels of employment for vulnerable groups only if expensive and intrusive active labor 
market policies assist disadvantaged adults in entering the labor market and if early-
intervention programs help disadvantaged children to accumulate sufficient skills. By 
reducing the budgetary room for such activating and preventive policies, the large call of the 
elderly on public resources threatens not only intergenerational but also intragenerational 
solidarity protecting disadvantaged adults who lack human and social capital.   
 
2.3 A life course perspective  
 
The various challenges described above involve the need to create more room for 
investments in human capital, particularly those that foster the adaptability of parents and 
their children. This subsection develops a life-course perspective to order to develop a 
coherent framework for exploring institutional reforms aimed at addressing the challenges.   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
women, especially for high-skilled women (see Anderson et al. (2002)).    13 
 
Reconcile career and family in longer life 
A modern knowledge-intensive economy requires longer periods of learning so that young 
adults start their working lives later. At the same time, older workers terminate their working 
careers earlier as effective retirement ages decline or stagnate, even though life expectancy 
increases. People thus concentrate work effort increasingly in the relatively short life season 
in which they also raise children (see Table 2.6 and Figures 2.5 and 2.6). At the same time, 
many parents wish to look after their children, especially immediately after childbirth. The 
key challenge is to accommodate these preferences by allowing parents to strengthen family 
life while also maintaining their human capital through continued attachment to the labor 
force so that they can enjoy long, fulfilling careers.   
 
From dividing tasks in breadwinner model to combining work and family   
The traditional breadwinner model relies on a strong division of labor between men and 
women. In the face of an eroding comparative advantage of men in paid work, young 
generations increasingly combine various activities by engaging simultaneously in learning, 
working, caring and relaxing. The relative importance of these activities varies during the life 
course, depending on family obligations and idiosyncratic and macro-economic shocks.  
 
Spring and fall complement summer and winter 
In the modern longer life course, adults spend considerable time in households without young 
children as a result of delays in family formation and parenthood as well as death. Indeed, in 
the “spring” of the modern life course (or early adulthood phase or “playtime of life”), young 
adults first experiment with relationships and jobs before they take responsibility for raising 
children during the “summer:” the family season when adults bear the responsibility for 
raising minors. After their children have grown up, adults typically spend considerable time 
in good health in the “fall” season of their life course (or the active senior phase) before they 
enter “winter:” the last phase of life in which people suffer from serious health problems. The 
modern life course is most apparent in Northern Europe. In this region, many people in the 
age brackets between 20 and 30 and between 50 and 60 live as singles or as couples without  14 
children. In Southern Europe, in contrast, the extended family is still dominant in these age 
groups. Figure 2.7 illustrates these different household patterns over the life course for 
Denmark (representing  Northern Europe) and Spain (representing Southern Europe).
8    
The summer season in the modern life course is quite hot. The costs of living are high 
while time is scarce, as parents invest not only in their children but also in their careers. 
During this so-called “rush-hour of life,” people may experience “combination stress.” 
Compared to other European household types, families with co-residing children are least 
satisfied with living conditions, including their work (or main activity), income, housing, and 
leisure time (see Avramov (2002)).  Time pressure can result in broken relationships and 
burn out. Especially single-parent households face both a “time crunch” and a “money bind.” 
In the spring and the fall, in contrast, the climate is more moderate. Adults thus do not have 
to care for young children and enjoy relatively high purchasing power. Figure 2.8 presents 
the purchasing power (corrected for the number of persons in the household) for the 
dominant household type for each age group in a typical Northern and Southern European 
country (the Netherlands and Italy, respectively).  The figure clearly shows the relatively 
affluent spring and fall seasons. In Italy, in contrast, the main transition is between leaving 
the family of the parents and starting a family with children oneself.   
  
                                                           
8 Kalle, Lambrechts and Cuyvers (2002) provide these data for twelve other EU countries.    15 
III Market and institution failures: the need for institutional innovation   
 
To explore the role of social policy, this section investigates relevant market and institutional 
failures in the accumulation of human capital over the life cycle.   
 
3.1 Market failures  
 
This subsection investigates various market failures that call for a policy response. These 
market failures include liquidity constraints, externalities of children and human-capital 
accumulation, adverse selection in labor market, and lack of forward-looking behavior.   
 
Liquidity constraints  
Agents cannot borrow against the future value of human capital because of adverse selection 
and moral hazard. Indeed, financial institutions cannot use human capital as collateral to 
ensure that loans are paid back. Liquidity constraints discourage parents from investing in the 
human capital of themselves and their children and tends to increasing the time pressure on 
young parents (see Apps and Rees (2004)).  
Capital-market imperfections also prevent agents from smoothing consumption over 
time in the face of various shocks. This stimulates precautionary saving because the presence 
of a financial buffer helps agents to optimally diversify temporary risks over time. Indeed, 
precautionary motives rather than saving for retirement tend to be the main reason why 
young households save (see Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005)).  
 
Externalities of children  
By socializing the intergenerational contract, PAYG pension and health insurance systems 
insure against childlessness. Children who have been reared by others support the elderly 
without children. By bearing children, parents thus generate positive external effects for the 
childless.
9 This provides an argument for public support of children through family support 
                                                           
9 These latter external effects of children are measured by the net tax burden on unborn generations computed 
by so-called generational accounting (see Auerbach, Kotlikoff and Leibfritz (1999)). These measures account 
for all public spending and taxation. For a survey of the literature of the effects of family policies (such as 
parental leave, child benefits and subsidized childcare) on fertility, see Björklund (2007).  16 
and publicly funded primary education and child care (see Sinn (2000)). The case for public 
support for households with children is stronger if these households cannot finance 
investments in children because they face capital market imperfections, including liquidity 
constraints. Table 3.1 reveals how much governments spend on family services and benefits 
compared to pension spending and other spending on the elderly.  
In the case of grants to families, the traditional arguments based on consumer 
sovereignty in favor of cash grants over in-kind subsidies are modified because children do 
not have a say in how parents spend cash grants. In order to ensure that the public resources 
benefit the children, the government may thus want to provide benefits in kind. Indeed, the 
key market failure is that children cannot choose their parents, are not able to buy services 
from them, and cannot ensure against being born in a disadvantaged family (see Cunha et al. 
(2005)).   
  As regards externalities of parental leave on children, Ruhm (2000) and Tanaka 
(2005) find on the basis of panel data for 16 European countries (and in the case of Tanaka 
(2005) also for Japan and the US) that job-protected paid parental leave enhances pediatric 
health. Parental time thus is an important investment in the human capital of young children. 
Care responsibilities can be outsourced, for example through formal child care. However, 
some more personal dimensions involving emotional attachment and care are difficult to 
contract out, especially in the beginning of a child’s life (see Plantenga (2005)). Blau (1999), 
Cunha et al. (2005) and Currie and Blau (2005) find that the features of the home 
environment are especially important in shaping the cognitive and non-cognitive abilities and 
talents of young children. 
The relationship between maternal employment and the cognitive development of 
children has been studied for the United States, which features only limited statutory 
maternity leave and publicly funded child care. These studies find that maternal employment 
tends to hurt the child’s development during a child’s first year. As regards the impact on the 
mother’s employment on older children, evidence is less conclusive and depends on the 
nature of the work performed by the mother and the child-care and school arrangements
10 
(see Blau and Currie (2004)). Ruhm (2002) finds that children appear to perform better when  17 
their mothers work part-time rather than full-time during their second and third years of life. 
An additional 20 hours per week of mother’s employment during the first three years of life 
harms the reading and mathematics performance of five- and six-year olds by about 0.10 
standard deviation.  
 
Externalities of human capital formation  
Welfare states protect the living standard of citizens who lack sufficient human and social 
capital to maintain a minimum standard of living. The implicit income insurance provided by 
the intragenerational social contract harms the incentives to accumulate human capital, 
supply labor, and form stable personal relationships. This provides arguments for public early 
intervention in case of disadvantaged groups and dysfunctional families (see Haveman and 
Wolfe (1995)) and public support for basic education more generally (see Bovenberg and 
Jacobs (2005)).
11 These instrument can help to ensure that citizens enter adult life with 
sufficient human capital and interpersonal skills. These citizens thus do not have to rely on 
social assistance but are productive enough to earn the minimum standard of living. The 
welfare state insuring against a lack of human capital makes human capital (including a work 
ethic) a merit good that yields positive externalities in terms of lower welfare payments for 
society at large.     
Learning is a dynamic process exhibiting increasing returns to scale: learning begets 
learning, as skills acquired early in life facilitate further learning (see Knudsen et al. (2006)). 
Empirical evidence indeed suggests that learning is most effective when it begins at a young 
age: marginal returns on schooling are highest for the young (see CEA (1997)). For elderly 
workers whose skills have become obsolete and who lack marketable skills, in contrast, in-
work benefits rather than public training programs are typically the most efficient way to 
attach them to the labor market and to build human capital through learning-by-doing in 
private firms (see Heckman (2000)). Indeed, adults prefer to learn through learning-by-doing 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
10 To illustrate, adolescents tend to suffer as a result of maternal employment if they are left unsupervised after 
school. 
11 Also other market imperfections, such as monopsony power of employers, a compressed wage structure, 
liquidity constraints, lack of contractibility of training, may prevent the efficient sharing of costs and benefits of 
training and thus result in underprovision of training (see OECD (2003), Chapter 5, Section 2). Liquidity 
constraints may hurt training especially for low-skilled workers. Low-skilled workers may lack funds also to 
invest in the human capital of children (e.g. by reducing working time).    18 
in a work setting. Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998) estimate that post-school learning in 
firms accounts for almost half of all skill formation in modern economies. Indeed, life-long 
learning is implemented primarily outside the formal education system in firms.        
  A related market failure involves the impact of the tax system on work. Redistributive 
taxation harms labor supply and encourages individuals to substitute time away from taxed 
formal work into untaxed home production (Sandmo (1990)). This is an argument in favor of 
subsidizing child care. Blau and Currie (2004), however, argue that the best available 
evidence suggests that the effects of child-care subsidies on labor-force participation tend to 
be rather small, as formal care crowds out informal care.    
 
Adverse selection in labor markets   
Privately negotiated labor contracts may yield inefficient solutions due to adverse selection. 
To illustrate, firms may not voluntarily offer socially optimal leave schemes if low-risk 
individuals who are not likely to take advantage of these schemes signal their status to 
employers by agreeing to contracts providing little or no leave (see Aghion and Hermalin 
(1990)). Government mandates forcing firms to offer leave schemes (e.g. parental schemes) 
combat this adverse selection. The same holds true for collectively negotiated mandates 
applying to a whole industry. These mandates may encourage the development of more 
inclusive and flexible workplace cultures in which workers who temporarily work shorter 
and more flexible hours remain employable and can enjoy fulfilling careers. This, in turn, is 
likely to strengthen social norms facilitating the combination of work and family 
obligations.
12 
  Most of the recent evidence suggests that public parental leave mandates increase 
female employment, but that lengthy entitlements depress the relative wages of women. 
Based on a panel of nine European countries, Ruhm (1998), for example, finds that job-
protected leave paid by the government raises female participation by about 3 percent. 
Apparently, women enter the labor force in order to qualify for leave benefits, while job-
protected leave accelerates the return to work of young mothers. Brief leave entitlements 
(three months) do not affect women’s earnings, but lengthier leave (nine months and longer) 
                                                           
12 For how changes in work patterns can change preferences and social norms, see Lindbeck (1997).     19 
depresses relative wages by about 3 percent. Indeed, with longer leave entitlements, 
employers face higher rescheduling costs in replacing young mothers during leave, especially 
in countries that restrict temporary fixed-term contracts. Moreover, a woman bearing 
multiple children depreciates her human capital by being away from her job for several years.     
 
Lack of foresight 
Behavioral economics is gathering more and more evidence that individuals suffer from 
myopic behavior and that they have difficulty planning for the future. To illustrate, many 
individuals believe that they should be saving more for retirement but are unable to do so 
(Laibson et al. (1998)). People apparently lack the self control that is required to implement a 
savings plan. Individuals may thus experience an unanticipated drop in consumption when 
their incomes decline as a result of retirement or the birth of children.  
A convenient way to model this behavior is hyperbolic discounting. With this type of 
discounting, nearby events are discounted more heavily than events that are still far away. 
These preferences imply time-inconsistent behavior and cause individuals to seek ways to 
commit themselves by restricting their discretion to reverse earlier decisions. Hyperbolic 
discounting can explain why women may understate the importance of remaining attached to 
the labor force in terms of protecting their future earning capabilities.    
 
3.2 Institutional failures 
 
This subsection explores various institutional failures that discourage the maintenance and 
accumulation of human capital over the life cycle: early retirement schemes, lack of wage 
flexibility, employment protection, malfunctioning housing markets, rigid workplace 
practices and cultures, high minimum-wage floors and inefficient social insurance schemes.   
 
Early retirement…  
Various schemes encouraging early retirement have resulted in workplace cultures that fail to 
maintain human capital. Various schemes facilitating early exit from the labor force have 
also produced an early retirement culture setting in motion a vicious circle: workers retire  20 
early because their skills are obsolete, while human capital is not maintained because people 
can retire early and thus feature only a short time horizon and a low utilization rate of human 
capital. Indeed, cross-country data show a strongly positive correlation between spending on 
training and the effective retirement age (see OECD (2006)). In Europe, additional leisure 
time after retirement is not used actively but rather for home-centered leisure activities and 
watching TV in particular (see Avramov and Maskova (2003)).  
The waste of human capital as a result of early retirement originates in the erroneous 
belief that early retirement reduces unemployment because the amount of work is fixed: the 
so-called ‘lump-of-labor fallacy.’ In fact, early retirement has contributed to unemployment 
by putting a heavy financial burden on companies and families with young children.
13 
Moreover, early retirement has nurtured working place cultures in which careers must be 
made during the time when people bear family responsibilities for young children, thereby 
creating time pressures in the family season of life in the age range between 30 and 45. By 
thus preventing men from taking on more household duties and caring for children, these 
cultures have fostered gender inequalities in employment and earnings patterns. Indeed, 
fathers often cite workplace cultures as the key reason why they are not more involved with 
their families (EFILWC (2003)). This explains why the European countries with the lowest 
effective retirement age also feature the lowest female participation and fertility rates. In this 
connection, early retirement has also worsened liquidity constraints in early adulthood by 
transferring resources away from this early phase in the adult life cycle to the active senior 
phase of the life course.   
 
…and lack of wage flexibility  
An important factor explaining the low effective retirement age in Europe is the lack of wage 
flexibility for elderly workers, which reduces labor demand and thus results in a weak labor-
market position of these workers. Since many social benefits (provided by unemployment 
and disability insurance, for example) are directly linked to previously earned wages through 
fixed replacement rates, elderly workers who have experienced a decline in their earning 
                                                           
13 Indeed, countries with the lowest participation rates (and thus labor supply) feature the highest unemployment 
rates (see Burniaux, Duval and Jaumotte (2004) and OECD (2006)).   21 
potential are hard pressed to find a job that is acceptable to them, and therefore reduce their 
search intensities.  
Wage rigidity explains the increase in structural, long-term inactivity in Europe 
following adverse macro-economic shocks and in the face of more idiosyncratic shocks to 
earning potentials of individual workers due to more creative destruction. Whereas European 
displaced workers experience smaller income losses than their American colleagues, they 
face smaller reemployment probabilities, resulting in further rapid depreciation of their 
human capital rather than restoration of old levels through on-the-job learning (see Ljungvist 
and Sargent (1998)). 
Another factor weakening the demand for older workers is the implicit labor contract 
according to which workers are underpaid when young and overpaid later on. This contract 
can encourage young workers to invest in firm-specific human capital and promote workers’ 
effort and cooperation. At the same time, however, it ties older workers with golden chains to 
their employer. Moreover, it makes older workers dependent on the survival of the firm they 
work for and discourages entrepreneurship. These workers thus experience a lack of security 
associated with “fear of falling” in a dynamic economy in which creative destruction causes 
companies to exhibit shorter life spans. Indeed, the implicit contract creates a gap between 
the insiders who are lucky enough to work for a surviving firm and the outsiders whose firms 
have not survived.  
Another drawback of the implicit contract is that it requires a mandatory retirement 
age at which workers are laid off (see Lazear (1979)). Hence, the speed and extent of phased 
retirement cannot act as a buffer for absorbing aggregate financial market and aggregate 
longevity risks. In an actuarially neutral pension system, working one year longer (and thus 
receiving annuities one year later) tends to raise their pension by about 8 percent. The speed 
and timing of retirement is thus a powerful instrument for absorbing risks.  
  
Employment protection  
Social insurance systems in various European countries protect breadwinners against income 
shocks through employment protection legislation and social insurance linked to previous 
earnings. These systems shielded families against poverty at a time when the earning  22 
potential of women was low and men could look forward to a continuously increasing wage 
profile in a single-track full-time career. In modern economies that rely on creative 
destruction and feature a large potential labor supply of female skilled workers who aim for 
careers in paid work, these systems protecting insiders are increasingly costly in terms of 
wasting human capital of outsiders, tying older incumbents to the fortunes of their employer, 
and discouraging these insiders from moving into new jobs that better fit their life season. 
Paradoxically, workers seem to feel more secure in those European countries in which 
employment protection is lowest (see Cahuc and Kramarz (2004)). One reason is that 
employment protection discourages not only firing but also hiring, thereby reducing the turn-
over in the labor market and thus the jobs that are opening up for new entrants to the labor 
market and those that want to to get out of their current jobs. Rather than the difficulty of 
being laid off from the current job, the ease with which a worker can find a new job is 
becoming increasingly important in determining the sentiment of security in a transitional 
labor market.   
In addition to preserving the status quo when innovation requires new work practices, 
employment protection discriminates against outsiders by slowing down turnover in the labor 
market. The lower probability of finding a good job in a dual labor market depresses the 
labor supply of secondary workers and raises the opportunity costs of bearing children for 
young, highly educated women. In countries with strict employment legislation in which 
workers hold permanent highly protected jobs, women face both higher unemployment risk 
and the prospect of lower future wage growth (through foregone experience and delayed 
wage growth) if they temporarily (or on a part-time basis) exit the labor market during the 
childbearing years. Indeed, worsened future career prospects rather than foregone earnings 
during the relatively short period spent with the baby account for the bulk of the opportunity 
costs (in terms of lower lifetime income) of becoming a mother (or of sharing household 
work and caring for a child as a father). Thus, whereas the literature has traditionally focused 
on maternity benefits and child care as the key towards reconciling work and family life, an 
inclusive labor market is at least as important because in such labor markets young workers  23 
do not have to engage in costly rent seeking to acquire highly protected jobs when they build 
a family.
14 
On the basis of a panel of OECD countries for the last 35 years, Adsera (2004) shows 
that countries with labor-market institutions facilitating women’s exit and entry in the labor 
market combine high fertility rates with high female labor supply. This third factor of rigid 
labor markets protecting insiders at the expense of younger workers explains why the cross-
country correlation between fertility and female labor-force participation, which has 
traditionally been negative (conforming to the theoretical predictions), became positive in the 
mid eighties (see Da Rocha and Fuster (2006)). In particular, fertility dropped in Southern 
European countries (with traditionally low female participation rates) when structural 
unemployment rose. In the same vein, Kugler and Pica (2003) find that employment 
protection in Italy raises employment for men, who are more likely to be insiders, at the 
expense of women, who are likely to be outsiders. Indeed, employment protection 
substantially depresses the hiring of young women.  
Bertola, Blau and Kahn (2002) show that employment protection and wage 
compression price women as well as young and elderly men out of employment and into 
other states (the informal economy, home making, education and retirement).
15 By 
discouraging employment of young adults and the elderly, these labor-market institutions 
thus contribute to the compression of the working life. Moreover, young adults stay in full-
time education longer than would be optimal. As a direct consequence, social adulthood and 
the responsibility for supporting oneself is increasingly postponed beyond the age of 
biological maturation.  
Using aggregate evidence for 12 European countries, Becker et al. (2004) find that 
low job security of children compared to their parents prevents young people from leaving 
the parental home and starting their own family. In particular, if the 20-30 year olds would 
have secure rather than insecure jobs, co-residence rates of children with their parents would 
                                                           
14 Using the European Community Household panel for 13 European countries, Adsera (2004b) finds that, 
compared to maternity benefits, flexible labor markets that do not penalize part-time work are more effective in 
stimulating fertility.   
15 OECD (2006, Chapter 3) also shows a significant negative relationship between employment protection and 
the employment rate of the population aged 50-64 across OECD countries.   24 
decline by 13 percentage points. For parents aged 50-59, co-residence rates with their 
children rise by 9 percentage points if they have secure rather than insecure jobs.    
 
Housing market: insiders versus outsiders 
Young households often face difficulties entering not only the labor market but also the 
housing market. To illustrate, rent control protecting incumbent renters typically reduces the 
rental housing supply for new entrants and results in the rationing of rental properties. As a 
direct consequence, workers find it difficult to move around. This hurts their job prospects 
and, more generally, the flexibility of the labor market.  
Tax incentives that are not targeted at new entrants may drive up house prices. High 
house prices reallocate resources from young households who have not entered the housing 
market towards older incumbents. Imperfect capital markets that prevent young households 
with insecure jobs from taking out mortgages add to the strain experienced by youngsters. 
The difficulty of entering the labor and housing markets discourages young people from 
starting a family. This lengthens the period of social adolescence, thereby postponing the 
establishment of a durable relationship and parenthood.     
 
Internal flexibility of firms  
Workplace practices and cultures in many countries are still oriented towards the full-time 
male breadwinner who can devote all of his time and energy to his career. Senior male 
management and unions (often dominated by older male workers) sometimes lack leadership 
in introducing family-friendly workplace measures. These measures include flexible leave 
policies (parental leave, emergency leave to care for sick elderly relatives or children); 
flexible working hours (e.g. school-holiday adjusted working hours; part-time work; flexi-
time); flexible working arrangements (like tele-working); support with child-care and 
eldercare; and provision of training during or after leave so that the allocation of work over 
the life cycle is better adjusted to the biological clock of women.
16 Even if some of these 
facilities are present, workers sometimes fail to take advantage of them because they fear that 
                                                           
16 Some countries are more successful than others in more fully reintegrating mothers into the labor market 
when their children have grown older (see Klammer (2005)).  25 
doing so would harm their careers (see Groot and Breedveld (2004)).
17 Indeed, employers 
may perceive women who take time off for childbirth as less committed to their career than 
male breadwinners, and are therefore less likely to invest in female career opportunities. This 
produces a vicious circle, as many women do not pursue a career in view of a limited 
likelihood to advancement.   
Empirical evidence suggests that the career effects of taking parental leave differ 
substantially across countries, reflecting different workplace cultures. To illustrate, Kunze 
(2003) finds that taking parental leave substantially reduces future wage growth in Germany. 
In Sweden, in contrast, women do not experience much smaller wage growth after taking 
parental leave (see Albrecht e.a. (1999)). Apparently, since taking parental leave is so 
common in Sweden, it does not signal anything about career commitment. Whereas the 
Swedish labor market for women is thus the outcome of a pooling equilibrium, the 
corresponding German market is better described by a separating equilibrium.   
  
High wage floors  
Welfare payments and minimum wages in many countries are based on a breadwinner having 
to care for a dependent adult and young children. The need to provide an income for two 
adults results in high minimum-wage floors and compresses the wage scale. Moreover, the 
limited wage flexibility at the bottom of the labor market puts the unskilled out of work, 
resulting in social exclusion and further loss of skills and morale. Indeed, high minimum 
wages act as a tax on employers who employ low-skilled labor. The absence of a low-wage 
sector prevents families (and also the elderly) from contracting-out household services 
(cleaning and housekeeping, small repairs around the house, child minding, old-age care).
18 
Women thus reduce their labor supply as households face more difficulties in reconciling 
work and family life.  
                                                           
17 Employee surveys suggest that workers especially value flexible working hours and short-duration leave 
schemes (see Table 2.5 but also  OECD, 2001a). For an overview of indicators of these arrangements, see 
OECD (2001a, Table 4.8).  Access to part-time work boosts female labor-force participation (see OECD, 2003, 
Chart 3.3).    
18 High-skilled households and low-skilled agents can get around the minimum-wage floors by contracting 
household services on the black market, where social protection and quality of service are (very) limited. 
Moreover, this raises moral issues, as unskilled workers complement social assistance benefits with additional 
labor income in the informal sector.    26 
The idea that a minimum wage should be sufficient to provide for a dependent adult 
and young children is increasingly inappropriate for two reasons (see also section 2). First of 
all, the potential earnings of the secondary earner have increased because of the stronger 
labor-market position of women. Second, in the modern longer life course, adults spend 
considerable time in households without young children. In the spring and fall of the modern 
life course, adults thus do not have to care for young children and therefore can make do with 
lower incomes and social protection. In any case, a higher minimum wage floor raises the 
human-capital requirements of those entering the labor force. If agents do not have sufficient 
capabilities to earn the minimum wage, they risk ending up in welfare schemes.  
 
Equity versus efficiency  
Redistribution from rich to poor and social insurance against income losses are basic 
functions of the welfare state. In modern welfare states, however, a large part of the taxes 
levied to finance social transfers merely redistributes resources from one stage in an 
individual’s life cycle to another. Hussénius and Selén (1994) estimated that for the average 
citizen in the early 1990s only about 24 percent of the taxes levied to finance social insurance 
in Sweden accomplished interpersonal redistribution. Pettersson and Pettersson (2003) 
recently updated and refined the estimates by Hussénius and Selén, estimating lifetime 
incomes with the aid of a dynamic micro-simulation model and including the value of 
important public services such as education, health care and care for the elderly in a 
comprehensive measure of lifetime income. With this extended concept of income, 
Pettersson and Pettersson found that only 18 percent of the taxes levied to finance social 
insurance transfers and social services in Sweden can be categorized as interpersonal 
redistribution. Falkingham and Harding (1996) found a degree of interpersonal redistribution 
of almost 50 percent in Australia and about 30 percent in Great Britain. For Ireland and Italy, 
O'Donoghue (2001) estimated a degree of interpersonal redistribution of 45 percent and 24 
percent, respectively.  Sørensen et al. (2006) found that the degree of interpersonal 
redistribution in Denmark amounts to 26 percent across all taxpayers.  
These studies show that a considerable part of the tax bill does not redistribute 
lifetime income from the life-time rich to the life-time poor but is essentially income that the  27 
taxpayer transfers to himself over his own life course. In the absence of an actuarial link 
between (social security) taxes paid and social transfers received, taxes and transfers 
inevitably distort labor supply. Moreover, transfer programs often create moral hazard, as 
taxpayers have no incentive to reduce their reliance on transfers.  
In a transitional labor market with a growing diversity of life courses, individuals 
increasingly experience periods of voluntary inactivity during their life course (to enjoy 
leisure, educate themselves, set up a business, or care for children or frail relatives). As noted 
above, the danger of moral hazard increases in such an environment. Moreover, annual 
incomes (on which many transfers and taxes are based) become an increasingly poor 
indicator of life-time needs. Indeed, more efficient capital markets allow individuals to 
smooth their consumption over their life courses themselves without the help of the welfare 
state.  
   28 
IV Policy recommendations  
 
The trends and challenges outlined in section 2 and the market and institutional failures in 
section 3 call for social innovation. Traditional social policies, such as high minimum wages 
and job protection, are increasingly counterproductive in generating social protection. At a 
time when corporations and governments are withdrawing from their traditional roles as 
insurers of human-capital risks, new institutions should be created to offer workers more 
durable social protection and lasting security. Indeed, a more dynamic world economy and a 
decline of the extended family and the firm as insurance devices have raised the demand for 
new ways to absorb social risks over the life cycle. These new institutions should operate in a 
transitional labor market in which human capital is the key determinant of macroeconomic 
performance and personal fulfillment. Each country, depending on its history, institutional 
framework, industrial sector, and worker’s preferences, will opt for different solutions. As 
most countries face similar challenges, however, we can outline some common policy 
conclusions for the OECD countries. These policy conclusions apply to most countries, albeit 
not to the same extent.  
 
4.1 A longer working life  
 
After describing the case for a longer working life, this subsection considers how this can be 
accomplished through reforms of retirement systems, social insurance and labor markets, in 
general, and wage-setting mechanisms, in particular.  
 
Raising retirement age in line with increased longevity 
A higher effective retirement age is crucial for a number of reasons. First of all, it raises the 
return on human capital by lengthening the horizon for investments in human capital. Indeed, 
raising the retirement age in line with longevity capitalizes the benefits of increased 
longevity in terms of more durable human capital. Increased longevity is then turned into an 
economic opportunity rather than a financial threat. In fact, one can argue that all ages that 
are used to measure old age should be linked to longevity so that one in fact measures old age 
from the end rather than the beginning of life. In this way, society ensures that social aging  29 
and biological aging do not diverge further and people age actively rather than passively. 
Moreover, fulfilling work that provides stimulus and companionship prevents social 
exclusion of the elderly, while better maintained human capital allows the elderly to bear 
more risk. Indeed, in many countries, tomorrow’s elderly can be expected to be healthier, 
wealthier and better educated than every before.      
Measuring age appropriately stabilizes pension systems, as increased longevity puts 
financial stress on not only PAYG-schemes but also funded pension schemes if retirement 
ages are not raised in line with life expectancy. Indeed, funded pension schemes are 
particularly vulnerable to increased longevity. The reason for this is that the longer life spent 
in retirement calls for more financial saving, which depresses the return on capital and thus 
hurts funded pension schemes. Indeed, aging calls for more accumulation, better maintenance 
and more intense use of human capital in addition to fiscal discipline and additional private 
saving. With better maintained human capital, effective retirement ages can be raised in line 
with longevity, thereby protecting long-run labor supply. 
Linking retirement ages to longevity also enables the government to issue longevity 
bonds so that insurance companies and pension funds are better able to provide retirement 
security to retired generations. This is because linking the age at which citizens first receive 
their public pension to life expectancy reduces the exposure of the government balance sheet 
to longevity risk. Hence, it becomes less unattractive for the government to acquire more 
longevity risk on behalf of younger and future generations. Indeed, these generations are best 
able to absorb these risks through a longer working life associated with more human-capital 
investment.  
The rule of automatically linking public pensions and tax privileges to life expectancy 
avoids the political costs of discretionary decisions to limit eligibility to public pensions and 
tax benefits if longevity increases further. Agreeing on a risk-sharing rule ex ante also 
reduces the political risks associated with collective discretionary decision-making. 
Moreover, it allows individuals and firms to adapt gradually to a longer working life by 
better maintaining human capital and adjusting the organization of work to the needs of older 
workers. An increase in spending on disability pensions and unemployment benefits is thus 
avoided.   30 
 
Decompressing the working life  
Another benefit of a higher effective retirement age is that it allows people to exploit their 
longer life to reconcile the two ambitions of, first, investing in the next generation as a parent 
and, second, pursuing a fulfilling career in paid work in which one keeps learning and 
applying new technologies. A longer active working life better fits the biological clock of 
women; whereas some men of about 45-50 years of age already look forward to their 
retirement, women in the same age group would like to return to work as their children are 
leaving the household. Indeed, a better reconciliation of work and family goes beyond child-
care facilities and parental leave schemes during the family phase, but involves the way the 
entire life course is organized.  
By decompressing the working life, a longer working life facilitates greater flexibility 
in employment patterns over the life course by loosening the link between age and career 
progression. This reduces career pressure at the biologically determined time when parents 
care for young children, thereby promoting gender equality, fertility and child development. 
Parents of young children can continue to invest in the human capital of their children 
without having to depreciate their own human capital. Rearing children and reducing work 
effort somewhat, or taking a career break during the family season thus becomes less costly 
in terms of depreciated human capital of the parents.
19 In this way, increased longevity can 
help to bring fertility back closer to replacement levels so that countries do not get entangled 
in a vicious circle of early retirement and lower fertility in which politically stronger older 
generations favor generous passive spending on pensions and healthcare at the expense of 
investments in the human capital of younger generations. 
   More generally, a longer working life reduces the need to transfer resources from the 
summer season of life to the fall season either through intergenerational transfers (such as 
PAYG pension systems) or through the allocation of resources over the life cycle (for 
example, through forced pension saving). This reduces the time and income squeeze in the 
hot summer of the modern life course and helps to relieve the liquidity constraints in this life 
season. Resources are used to proactively to maintain and invest in human capital rather than  31 
to reactively provide additional transfer income as a compensation for the premature 
depreciation of human capital.  
 
A higher and more flexible effective retirement age requires actuarially fair systems…   
More adaptability and employability facilitating a longer effective working life requires 
people to bear more individual responsibility for the maintenance of their own human capital, 
thereby stimulating life-long learning in firms.
20 To that end, retirement schemes should be 
actuarially fair. This gives workers also more individual choice about when and how to retire. 
Indeed, actual retirement ages should be flexible and adjust to individual circumstances and 
preferences. To illustrate, blue-collar workers who started to work early and exhibit lower 
life expectancy than others may want to retire earlier.
21   
 
….tighter eligibility criteria for passive unemployment and disability benefits,.. 
As another way to stimulate the maintenance of human capital, the eligibility criteria for 
passive unemployment and disability benefits facilitating early retirement and rapid 
depreciation of human capital should be tightened and should not depend directly on age. 
Moreover, by no longer allowing firms to shift the costs of reorganizations onto public 
disability or unemployment schemes, governments encourage firms and social partners to 
invest more in older workers (instead of getting rid of them) and to adapt work and 
workplace cultures to the needs of elderly workers. Indeed, for some types of social 
insurance (such as disability and unemployment insurance), large firms can become the 
insurer of the first period of inactivity.     
 
…and flexible wage setting and employment practices 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
19 A longer working life also helps to spread human capital risks, such as a spell of unemployment, over a 
longer working career.   
20 See OECD (2006) for a comprehensive three-pronged approach to increasing effective retirement ages: 
getting labor-supply incentives right; raising demand for older workers by changing employment practices; and 
promoting employability.   
21 Actuarially fair retirement systems that link pension benefits to longevity not only on a macro level but also 
on the level of homogeneous group of workers can facilitate retirement ages that are better tailored to the health 
of workers. Indeed, life expectancy typically differs substantially  across various socioeconomic groups with 
low-skilled workers featuring lower life expectancy than high-skilled workers.   32 
A more flexible labor market for elderly workers ensures that additional demand for older 
workers matches additional supply generated by improved labor-supply incentives. Together 
with less employment protection, wages that are more closely related to labor productivity 
(for example, by diminishing the role of seniority-based pay increments and rigid worker 
classification systems) reduce the need for mandatory retirement. Hence, workers can use the 
speed and time of retirement as an instrument to buffer risk. As the elderly become better 
educated, their human capital is better maintained during the life course and individuals 
anticipate the possibility of a declining wage, rewarding  elderly workers on the basis of their 
marginal productivity can become socially acceptable. 
More generally, if workers are no longer paid more than their productivity when old, 
the labor-market position of elderly workers becomes stronger so that elderly workers enjoy 
more discretion to adjust working conditions to their specific needs. More flexible retirement 
patterns (e.g. part-time and gradual retirement) and more opportunities to change jobs and 
work patterns (so that elderly workers become less dependent on their current job and the 
talents of elderly workers can be better used) then become possible.
22 The flexibility to 
change one’s working conditions to better suit changing needs and to find new challenges in 
fulfilling work can help to extend fulfilling working lives. The positive effect of flexibility on 
labor-market attachment holds true also for women between the ages of 50 and 70, who often 
provide informal care to aging, fragile relatives and friends. This informal care is likely to 
remain important in the future due to shrinking family sizes and budgetary pressures on 
formal care provided by the public sector.       
 
4.2 More flexibility of working time over the life course 
 
This subsection first argues in favor of a more flexible allocation of working time over the 
life cycle and then considers how saving accounts can help individuals to achieve more 
sovereignty over the way they allocate time over their life courses.   
 
More flexibility of working time over the life course protects labor supply  33 
More flexibility in allocating working time over the life course can prevent stress and 
excessive time squeeze when workers bear substantial family responsibilities. Moreover, it 
helps women, who still carry most of the family obligations (see Table 2.1), to remain 
attached to the labor force. Their human capital is thus maintained better, thereby 
strengthening their labor-market position and raising their labor-force participation when the 
children have grown up. The opportunity to alter one’s working patterns to better fit 
changing private circumstances is thus an important instrument to protect the labor supply of 
not only older workers but also young parents. Greater flexibility in employment and career 
patterns can also encourage men to take up more family responsibilities in middle age. 
Indeed, Europeans show a keen interest in more flexible working-time regimes (see EFILWC 
(2003) and Table 2.5).  
 
Savings accounts provide more individual discretion over working times…. 
More individual discretion in allocating working time (i.e. time sovereignty) over the life 
course requires more individual responsibility for financing periods of (part-time) leave. This 
ensures that more flexibility in selecting work times results in more rather than less hours 
worked over the life course as a whole. In this connection, tax-favored savings accounts for 
financing (part-time) parental leave can supplement minimum public income provisions 
(such as child and child-care benefits and publicly financed parental leave schemes) to 
protect purchasing power during the summer of the family season without resulting in 
excessive consumption of leave and childcare and large budgetary costs. In this way, tax 
incentives help internalize the externalities of children at relatively low costs, while at the 
same time stimulating the labor supply of younger workers in the spring season of life. 
Savings accounts that are the property of the individual worker also strengthen the position of 
the worker vis-à-vis the employer and thus contribute to the emancipation of workers. 
Whereas the employer creates flexible work arrangements and career paths, the worker can 
offer to finance (part of) the actual leave taken.   
To further protect overall labor supply over the life cycle, personal savings accounts 
can be integrated with tax-favored (early) retirement accounts. In particular, individuals can 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
22 The health of the elderly seem to benefit from being engaged in a variety of activities (see Avramov and  34 
be allowed to withdraw funds from these accounts before retirement -- for example, to care 
for children or to update skills.
23 Hence, rather than taking leave only at the end of the 
working life to facilitate the rapid depreciation of human capital through passive social 
insurance (and early retirement) benefits, individuals can use the funds already in the 
stressful and expensive family season of life to invest in the human capital of their children 
or their own human capital so as to prevent the obsolescence of skills. In this way, 
individuals save for old-age risks in the form of not only financial but also human capital; by 
investing in human capital earlier in life, individuals are able to work longer.  
By helping agents to take more responsibility for drops in income, savings accounts 
can stimulate not only a more flexible working life but also a more flexible labor market and 
better management of human resources. In particular, individuals can self-insure a larger part 
of the shocks to the value of their human capital by using personal savings accounts. For 
example, older workers can draw on the account to retire gradually or supplement a reduction 
in the hourly wage at an advanced age. This facilitates wage flexibility of older workers, 
thereby strengthening their labor-market position.  
 
4.3 Workplace cultures aimed at employability and flexibility  
 
How can more flexible work places and work cultures that better maintain the talents of 
workers be achieved? This subsection investigates this question.  
 
More flexible and inclusive workplace cultures aimed at employability…  
Social partners should nurture more inclusive, flexible workplace cultures that reconcile the 
needs of individual employees who balance work with family obligations with the needs of 
employers to flexibly respond to fluctuations in demand in increasingly competitive markets. 
In order to remain competitive in an aging labor market and to promote themselves as good 
places to work, firms should attune work conditions to the needs of employees who want to 
remain employable despite substantial family obligations and rapid innovation and creative 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Maskova (2003)).   
23 The government may want to subsidize some withdrawals if these withdrawals are used to finance care 
activities with positive externalities.    35 
destruction. They should aim to create workplaces in which workers develop and maintain 
their talents, skills and health. Moreover, firms should help their workers to think and plan 
ahead about how they can remain productive in fulfilling work when they grow older (e.g. by 
taking education leave in mid career). Reducing excessive stress or physical strain at an early 
stage can help to extend working lives. Proactive thinking aimed at preventing human-capital 
risks later in life is called for in aging societies in which human resources become 
increasingly scarce and early retirement schemes are being phased out. 
 
….with wage flexibility 
  Employees should accept more wage flexibility, internal flexibility in work practices, less 
employment protection for full-time male breadwinners, and more personal responsibility for 
financing leave and their own personal development (including early retirement and the costs 
of training). Rather than engaging in general, rigid working-time reductions, social partners 
should allow more flexible working times tailored to the needs of individual workers and 
firms. This may require changes in the way work is structured. The necessary changes in 
cultures and organizations aimed at better managing human resources will happen only 
gradually as many companies still base their working conditions on a male breadwinner who 
is freed from other duties and can retire early.    
 
4.4 More inclusive labor and housing markets  
 
More inclusive labor and housing markets can help young adults in a crucial phase of their 
life course. This subsection explores various policy options for achieving better functioning 
labor and housing markets.  
 
Protection through flexibility to enter and to adjust 
To allow young adults to build a family, European labor markets should become more 
inclusive so that workers do not have to be continuously employed full time in order to enjoy 
a successful career. Rather than shielding insiders through employment protection, labor-
market institutions should enable parents of young children, secondary workers and young  36 
people to easily enter and remain in the labor market (e.g. through job-protected parental 
leave) and adjust their working conditions to changes in family conditions. This helps to 
reduce the opportunity costs in terms of foregone career prospects of becoming a mother and 
of sharing household work for fathers. Various privileges for full-time male breadwinners 
should be replaced by facilities that allow parents to raise young children while maintaining 
their own employability. Employability is the best employment protection.  
 
Portable arrangements diversify firm-specific risks   
Basing their security on employability and portable saving, retirement and social insurance 
schemes rather than on employment protection helps workers to better diversify their human 
and financial capital; emancipated workers become less dependent on the firm for which they 
work. Endowed with sufficient human and financial capital, adaptable individuals are 
empowered to embrace the non-verifiable, idiosyncratic risks associated with creative 
destruction in a dynamic competitive world economy and a transitional labor market. 
Moreover, workers enjoy greater flexibility in adjusting working conditions to changing 
needs during their life courses and in finding fresh challenges from which they can continue 
to learn.  
 
Decompressing the working life by shortening social adolescence 
A more inclusive labor market can help reverse the trend towards a compression of the 
working life and postponement of social adulthood by facilitating the first entry into the labor 
market. Condensing the period of full-time education, combining learning with work at an 
earlier state, and spreading learning more over the life cycle by integrating it better with work 
could also be helpful in shortening the period of social adolescence, decompressing the 
working life, and bringing forward parenthood.
24 Activating social policies should induce 
young adults to build up their human capital through education, work or both. Indeed, some 
form of education (possibly combined with work) could be compulsory until a young adult 
has achieved some minimum qualification.    
  37 
Role of housing   
Also a well-functioning housing market can reduce the stress that young adults experience in 
the early reproductive stage of their lives. Moreover, tax facilities for home ownership may 
have to be targeted better at new entrants into the housing market. Equity in housing can also 
help the old to supplement their pension -- for example, to pay for their medical expenditures 
and other consumption needs. Financial innovation (for example, through reverse mortgages) 
may be needed to turn home equity into an income stream.   
 
4.5 From breadwinner support to in-work benefits for parents  
 
Support for families has traditionally been provided through passive income support to  
breadwinners. This subsection argues in favor of targeting support to parents with young 
children with an increased emphasis on in-work benefits for vulnerable groups.  
 
In-work benefits and mutual obligations strengthen labor-market position of low skilled…   
Lower minimum-wage floors boost the supply of reliable household services for families and 
the elderly, while at the same time improving the employment prospects of low-skilled 
women in the formal labor market. To accomplish this while protecting the income position 
of vulnerable households, more activating social assistance should be combined with in-work 
benefits (including child-care benefits) for parents caring for young children. In particular, 
social assistance based on mutual obligations should be conditional on each adult (including 
low-skilled women) being available to the labor market --- possibly on a part-time basis 
while parents care for young children who are not yet of school age.
25 Work and search 
obligations should thus be credibly enforced for both lone mothers and secondary earners 
within a two-adult household. In this way, parents would realize that living on passive long-
term social benefits (supplemented by black market activities) is not an option. They are thus 
encouraged to maintain their marketable skills so that they are able to re-enter the labor 
market in a full-time job when their children are older. This would boost labor supply. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
24 For early school leavers with few skills, the obligation to either work and/or learn can help to inculcate a 
work ethic and generate human capital. 
25 Box 3.5 in OECD (2003b) contains some valuable suggestions on how this could be done.   38 
 
… by decoupling income policy from the allocative role of wages 
With less wage compression, in-work benefits can be better targeted at low-skilled workers 
with children whose productivity is insufficient to earn a minimum standard of living, 
without the phasing-out of these in-work benefits resulting in very high marginal tax rates 
higher up the income scale. By moving away from breadwinner support (in which the 
breadwinner needs to earn sufficient wage income to provide for a dependent adult and 
children) towards targeted in-work benefits for families with young children, governments 
decouple income policy from the allocative role of wages. This creates more low-wage jobs 
in the formal sector.   
 
Subsidized child care can protect human capital  
Subsidized (or publicly provided) child care for households with low earnings helps women 
(including single mothers) to escape poverty, and alleviates liquidity constraints during the 
summer season of life. At the same time, school times should be attuned to the needs of 
working parents, with affordable after-school care for children of working parents with low 
labor incomes. Subsidies for high quality child care internalize the externalities of child 
development and alleviate the distortions of the tax system on female participation and 
human capital accumulation in the formal sector and the production of labor-intensive goods 
and services in the untaxed household sector. In view of their higher rates of labor-force 
participation, high-skilled women tend to benefit most from general child-care subsidies. 
Targeting child-care subsidies and child benefits (and other family benefits) at low-income 
households alleviates poverty but yields high marginal tax rates and thus disincentives to 
increase the earnings of the secondary earner in the phase-out range.
26 Hence, governments 
face a difficult trade-off between poverty alleviation and gender equality. The same trade-off 
bedevils the choice between household income or individual income as a base for 
redistribution.   
 
                                                           
26 Targeting may also stimulate the breaking up of families. The associated damage to role of the family as an 
institution for buffering risk and providing mutual care reduces the effectiveness of targeting in alleviating 
poverty.   39 
Early intervention in disadvantaged families 
Activating policies facilitate social integration of low-skilled migrants and their children, 
especially if work obligations for women are combined with programs supporting the 
development of young children. Indeed, early intervention in dysfunctional families is the 
key to preventing social exclusion, raising the participation rates of unskilled men and 
women alike, and encouraging durable two-parent families. A proactive social policy aims at 
creating equal opportunities at the start of life through an equal distribution of human capital. 
Early interventions aimed at enriching the family environments of disadvantaged children 
can carry a high economic return in terms of raising school performance in adolescence and 
boosting wages and labor-force participation in adulthood (see Cunha et al. (2005) and Currie 
and Blau (2005)). At early ages, therefore, a trade-off between equity (targeting the most 
disadvantaged children) and efficiency (targeting training at those individuals who yield the 
highest return on learning) is absent. Once skills have been formed at later ages, returns on 
schooling are the largest for the most able, so that a trade-off between equity and efficiency 
exists. Accordingly, social policy can become more efficient by redirecting skill investments 
in disadvantaged groups from adults to young children.    
 
4.6 Shift public support from the old to the young  
 
The aging of the population is due to increased longevity and lower fertility. Whereas both 
funded and PAYG pension systems are vulnerable to increased longevity, PAYG pension 
schemes are especially vulnerable to lower fertility because PAYG systems rely on human 
capital of the young to finance the pensions of older generations. As generations invest less 
in the human capital of the next generations by reducing fertility, they should invest more in 
financial capital. Hence, lower fertility calls for gradually shifting from PAYG financing to 
funded pension schemes (see Sinn (2000)). In this way, public support is gradually shifted 
away from the fall and winter seasons of life towards the spring and summer seasons.
27 This 
is consistent with a gradual move from a reactive social policy that provides passive income 
                                                           
27 Whereas increased saving and more public support for young parents at the expense of the elderly is the 
appropriate response to lower fertility, increased longevity calls primarily for a higher retirement age and more 
investment in human capital.  40 
support to those who have depreciated their human capital to a proactive social policy that 
helps people to build up and manage human talents better. Stimulating private saving for 
retirement by shifting public PAYG benefits from the old to young parents is thus not only 
the appropriate response to declining fertility but also helps to halt the decline in fertility and 
to internalize the positive externalities of additional children in PAYG pension systems (see 
van Groezen et al. (2003)). 
Countries with large PAYG systems should consider focusing the public scheme on 
poverty alleviation by gradually reducing earnings-related PAYG benefits for those earning 
higher incomes. This would yield a better balanced portfolio between funded and PAYG 
schemes, as workers with middle- and higher incomes substitute private, funded pensions for 
public PAYG benefits (see also OECD (2001b), Chapter 6). Reducing PAYG benefits for, 
and increasing the tax payments by, the more affluent elderly is consistent with the trend 
towards a more heterogeneous older population. When PAYG schemes were established, the 
economic depression of the 1930’s and the second world war had impoverished the older 
generation. Since poverty was thus concentrated among the elderly, poverty alleviation called 
for transfers from the younger to the older generation. At present, in contrast, age is generally 
no longer a good indicator of poverty, as many elderly have accumulated substantial financial 
wealth and more risks have shifted to the beginning of the life cycle. Hence, information on 
age should increasingly be supplemented by other information (particularly on incomes and 
family status) to identify those most in need of income support.
28  
The currently retired generation has not been able to anticipate lower public PAYG 
benefits. Moreover, this generation cannot adjust easily because it has already depreciated its 
human capital. Accordingly, a strong case can be made for changing the rules of the game 
(i.e. reducing PAYG benefits and increasing taxes on the elderly) only gradually.
29 Extensive 
grandfathering provisions protecting those who are currently old are expensive, however, and 
would eliminate benefits in terms of enhanced fiscal sustainability. Indeed, grandfathering 
implies that younger generations have to pay not only for their own private benefits but also 
for the public benefits of the currently old. The government thus faces a trade-off between 
                                                           
28 Dang et al. (2006) argue that social spending (taxation) can be reallocated from the old (young) to the young 
(old) without compromising the objective of preventing old-age poverty.   
29 Relative PAYG benefits can be reduced gradually by indexing benefits to prices rather than wages.    41 
flexibility and stability. To enhance confidence and trust in a stable social contract while at 
the same time facilitating timely adjustments, governments should announce as early as 
possible any prospective changes in the social contract. This would allow the large baby-
boom generations to anticipate reduced public transfers in retirement by starting to build up 
more funded pensions.    
 
4.7 Individual accounts in social insurance   
 
This subsection makes a case in favor of mandatory individual accounts for social insurance 
that are complemented by liquidity and life-time income insurance. This would enhance the 
trade-off between equity and efficiency in social insurance.  
 
Self insurance… 
Social security can in part be based on mandatory contributions to individual accounts.
30 
These accounts can in fact be viewed as a self-insurance device against human capital risk 
over the life cycle (due not only to old age, but also to unemployment and obsolescence of 
human capital during the working life). Agents become stakeholders in their own social 
security. If individuals bear more financial responsibility for the maintenance of their own 
employability, they face better incentives to work and train than under regular social 
insurance. By allowing people to shift the payment of deductibles in social insurance to the 
periods in which these costs can be more easily afforded, the schemes continue to offer 
security even though human-capital risks have become less easily insurable.  
 
…with liquidity insurance and life-time income protection …  
The government in effect provides liquidity insurance and alleviates capital-market 
imperfections by allowing individuals to make withdrawals from the accounts even if the 
account balance is negative. Moreover, the government can protect the lifetime poor by 
bailing out individuals who end up with a negative account balance at the end of their 
                                                           
30 See Orszag and Snower (1997) and Stiglitz and Yun (2002), who propose replacing part of unemployment 
insurance with mandatory individual savings accounts. These savings accounts can also be in the form of so-
called notional accounts. The implied PAYG financing avoids a costly transition.   42 
working lives. In this way, the government provides insurance against catastrophic shocks 
that substantially harm lifetime incomes. Redistribution is thus targeted more closely at the 
lifetime poor who are suffering a combination of low wage incomes and frequent adverse 
shocks during their lives.   
 
…yields more efficient insurance….  
The accounts, in fact, combine a number of risks that occur during different periods of an 
individual's life in a single insurance contract with a deductible that is conditioned on the 
aggregate loss during the life course. Gollier and Schlesinger (1995) show that an umbrella 
insurance policy that adjusts the deductible on each separate loss to the outcome of the other 
risks in the form of a straight deductible based on the aggregate loss provides the best 
protection against large aggregate losses for a given insurance budget. Compared to separate 
insurance policies, the umbrella insurance contract provides better protection in the worst-
case scenario of a succession of adverse shocks during the life course in exchange for less 
protection in other cases. 
 
…but requires compulsion and active labor-market policies,…   
Lifetime redistribution as well as liquidity and lifetime income insurance still give rise to 
moral hazard; agents have an incentive to minimize their contributions and maximize their 
withdrawals. The proposed system thus does not escape the fundamental trade off between 
actuarial fairness and basic income protection. The government must therefore regulate 
withdrawals so that they can be made only for pre-specified purposes. Especially the lifetime 
poor will continue to face high marginal tax rates as a direct consequence of the lifetime 
income guarantee. Hence, the government should focuses its active labor-market policies 
(including workfare) on this group and employ instruments other than financial incentives to 
activate the lifetime poor. Savings must also be mandatory -- at least until a specific upper 
limit is reached. In addition to moral hazard, lack of self control and myopia are other 
reasons for making saving mandatory. Compulsory savings accounts in effect extend 
mandatory saving aimed at retirement to precautionary saving aimed at social insurance for 
individuals of working age.    43 
 
…uncorrelated shocks and inclusive labor markets,…  
 The potential of individual accounts in improving the trade-off between insurance and 
incentives depends crucially on the extent to which individuals face correlated shocks during 
their lifetimes. The potential welfare gains of individual savings accounts are large if various 
income shocks are uncorrelated across time and among each other. In that case, annual 
incomes are poor indicators of lifetime incomes, and income shocks are in fact only small in 
the context of an entire lifetime. If shocks are strongly positively correlated, in contrast, risks 
do not become much smaller in a lifetime context (compared to an annual context). Risks 
then remain catastrophic, even when viewed over the entire life course. For each type of 
human capital risk, another combination between insurance and self-insurance through 
saving is optimal, depending on the magnitude of the risk in terms of the potential drop in 
lifetime income and the potential danger of moral hazard because of endogeneity and non-
verifiability of the insured risk. Self-insurance should be relatively important for non-
catastrophic risks that people can affect through non-verifiable actions (see Stiglitz and Yun 
(2002)). Hence, individual accounts become more attractive in fast-moving transitional labor 
markets in which people experience short involuntary unemployment spells in addition to 
voluntary periods of absence from the labor market. The opposite is true in the presence of 
dual labor markets in which insiders enjoy high incomes throughout their lives while 
disadvantaged outsiders must make do with insecure jobs and tend to suffer from frequent 
and long-lasting unemployment. 
 
….and equal distribution of human capital  
Mandatory individual savings accounts can thus be a useful component of an overall social 
policy package that includes policies aimed at creating equal opportunities at the start of life 
through an equal distribution of human capital and early intervention. It should also provide 
some form of lifetime income guarantee. By using information on lifetime incomes, 
redistribution implicit in such an income guarantee can occur at lower efficiency costs. 
Moreover, actuarially fair links between contributions and expected benefits alleviate the 
labour-market distortions associated with social insurance for middle- and high incomes.  44 
Finally, by facilitating consumption-smoothing through saving schemes offering liquidity 
insurance, the government increases the scope for self-insurance, thereby combating moral 
hazard in social insurance. Through all of these channels, savings accounts support social 
policy by reducing the costs that are associated with an effective mix of redistribution, social 
insurance and consumption smoothing.   45 
V Conclusions  
  
The policy conclusions imply transforming passive benefits compensating the loss of human 
capital into preventive, proactive social policies that build and maintain human capital. 
Another common thread in these conclusions is the importance of flexibility in wages and 
work practices. As workers increasingly combine their work with other activities (caring, 
resting and learning), new social-protection institutions should facilitate various transitions 
and changing combinations of activities during the life course. Among other things, an 
adaptable labor force provides the legitimacy for competitive open markets and the creative 
destruction associated with rapid innovation and growth. Moreover, substantial human 
capital contributes to a high level of labor-force participation as the basis for ensuring 
solidarity with vulnerable elderly, children and disadvantaged adults of working age.  
The required reforms confront politicians with a major challenge because these 
reforms often run against vested interests and the perceived short-term interests of powerful 
insiders. Moreover, transforming passive, reactive social policies into more proactive policies 
yields a transitional problem similar to that associated with a shift from a PAYG to a funded 
pension system. In particular, society still has to pay for passive benefits to the currently old 
generations; these generations have typically depreciated their human capital because they 
have not profited from more proactive social policies. At the same time, the human-capital 
investments in the young generations, which reduce social spending and increase tax 
revenues only with a lag, must be financed. The combination of passive old-age benefits and 
proactive spending aimed at especially the human capital of younger generations can create 
fiscal pressures and gives rise to difficult political choices.
31  
As people gain more discretion to construct their own biographies, they become more 
responsible for their life courses. A challenge in this respect is to better prepare people for 
more responsibility for their employability, social insurance and financial planning. Schools, 
employers and unions can play an important role in helping people acquire the necessary 
financial competences and life and work skills. This may also make voters more aware of the 
                                                           
31 For an elaborate analysis of the political economy of the types of reforms proposed in this paper, see 
Bovenberg (2007).    46 
fundamental trade-offs in social policy, thereby enhancing the quality of the political debate 
and policymaking (see Boeri and Tabellini (2005)).   
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Table 2.1. Time spent on 4 different obligations in hours a week working population 
EU-15, 2003  
 
Men Women 






























EU Total  58.4  42.6  13.3  0.8  1.7 59.5  34.7  22.6  0.8 1.8 
Finland 55.1 40.8  10.5  1.5  2.4 59.9  37.3  18.3  1.3 2.6 
Sweden 56.9 40.4  13.6  2.0  1.2 59.1  37.0  18.9  1.6 1.6 













































Netherlands 54.9  39.8 11.6  1.4 1.9 53.4  27.4  23.8  1.8 1.2 























Ireland 56.2  43.7  11.0  0.7  1.0 59.6  33.7  23.8  1.3 2.6 
Belgium 59.5  42.3  13.7  0.8 1.3 60.7  36.4  21.5  0.6 1.2 
Luxembourg 66.0  43.2  19.0  2.4  1.9 69.4  32.9  32.0  3.5 2.3 
Austria 60.3 46.2  11.5  1.3  1.8 62.2  37.7  22.2  0.9 1.4 
France 52.7  40.0  10.4  0.9  0.9 55.5  35.9  18.2  0.6 1.6 
Portugal  54.1  45.1    8.4  0.4 0.4 64.6  41.9  21.4  0.3 1.0 
Spain 59.0  44.0  13.4  0.1  1.7 67.9  39.9  23.8  0.2 3.1 
Italy 66.0  45.0  18.0  0.8  1.8 66.3  39.5  25.3  1.1 2.0 
Greece 61.5  46.9  13.0  1.0  2.0 69.8  41.2  26.8  1.3 1.7 
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Table 2.2. Female employment rate and the presence of children, 2000 (persons aged 
25-54) 
 


















Australia 66.8  20.0  68.4  16.1 55.3  33.3 43.2  47.5 
Austria 73.5  16.2  76.0  10.5 75.6  18.5 65.7  29.0 
Belgium 67.8  20.1  65.6  17.4 71.8  23.5 69.3  24.7 
Canada 74.0  11.8  76.5     6.0  74.9  14.9  68.2  23.6 
Czech 
Republic 
73.7  15.6  80.8    5.4  72.3  21.2  59.4  33.5 
Denmark 
(1998) 
80.5    7.7  78.5    7.7  88.1    3.5  77.2  12.9 
Finland 
(1997) 
77.6    7.0  79.2    0.1  78.5  11.8  73.5  19.7 
France  69.6  17.7  73.5    9.6  74.1  18.7  58.8  32.9 
Germany 71.1  16.3  77.3     7.2  70.4  21.2  56.3  35.6 
Greece  52.6  35.9 53.1  31.1 53.9  40.3 50.3  45.4 
Hungary 61.7  16.0             
Ireland 53.1  29.0  65.8  14.1 51.0  33.2 40.8  43.2 
Italy 50.7 33.9  52.8 26.2 52.1  40.9 42.4  49.9 
Japan (1999)  62.7  31.6             
Luxembourg 63.0  29.8  68.7  21.3 65.8  30.4 50.1  46.1 
Netherlands 70.9  21.4  75.3 15.6  69.9 24.3  63.3 30.8 
New Zealand 
(2001) 
70.6  17.0  80.7    5.7  66.9  20.2  58.9  30.9 
Poland  72.0    9.6             
Portugal 73.9  16.4  72.6  13.4 78.5  16.6 70.3  24.8 
Slovak 
Republic 
64.8 13.7             
Spain 50.6  34.8  54.6  26.0 47.6  44.7 43.3  48.6 
Sweden  81.7    4.1  81.9   -0.4  80.6    9.8  81.8    9.4 
Turkey              
United 
Kingdom 
73.1  14.4  79.9    5.4  72.9  17.1  62.3  28.2 
United States 
(1999) 
74.1  14.8  78.6    7.2  75.6  17.4  64.7  29.0 
Unweighted 
average 
69.0 18.6  73.7 11.8  70.6 22.9  61.9 32.3 
 
1 Gender gap: percentage point difference between the employment rates for men and women. 
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 Table 2.3. Fertility, 1980-2004,  and mean age of women at childbearing first child, 
1980-2003 
 
  Total fertility rate  Mean age of women at childbearing first child 
(years)
  
  1980 1990 2001 2004  1980  1992  1998  2003 
Austria 1.7  1.4  1.3  1.4  26.30 27.30 28.00 28.80 
Belgium  1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6  26.60  28.09     
Canada  1.7 1.7 1.5 1.5    28.40     
Czech Republic  2.1  1.9  1.1  1.2       24.82  26.64  28.10 
Denmark 1.5  1.7  1.7  1.8  26.80 28.77 29.52 30.10 
Finland 1.6  1.8  1.7  1.8  27.70 28.95 29.55 29.80 
France  2.0  1.8  1.9  1.9  26.80           




Greece  2.2 1.4 1.3 1.3  26.10  27.55  28.70  29.40
2 
Hungary 1.9  1.8  1.3  1.3    25.80 26.86 28.00 
Ireland  3.2 2.1 2.0 1.9  29.90 30.01 30.30 30.60 
Italy 1.6  1.3  1.2  1.3 27.40  29.21  30.30
3  
Luxembourg 1.5  1.6  1.7  1.7  27.50 28.58 29.25 29.90 
Netherlands 1.6  1.6  1.7  1.7  27.70 29.67 30.25 30.40 
Poland 2.3  2.0  1.3  1.2    26.38 27.19 27.90 
Portugal 2.2  1.6  1.5  1.4  27.10 27.60 28.40 29.00 
Slovak Republic  2.3  2.1  1.2  1.2       25.13  26.39
 3 27.30 
Spain  2.2 1.4 1.3 1.3  28.20 29.25 30.55 30.80
 2 
Sweden 1.7  2.1  1.6  1.8  27.60 28.87 29.73 30.30 
Turkey  4.4 3.0 2.5 2.2         
United Kingdom  1.8  1.8  1.6  1.8  26.90 27.84 28.32 28.80 
United  States  1.8 2.1 2.1 2.1         
 




Sources: OECD Social indicators database; Eurostat. 
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Table 2.4. Preferences for hours worked, 1998
1 (Total hours in couple families where the 








Change in hours needed to 
meet preferences 
Percentage of families 



































































































































































































































1 The table provides information on average hours worked and preferred hours, according to the perceived financial 
situation of a household in 1998. The information about preferred hours is derived from questions about a ‘free 
choice’ of hours by the respondents and his/her partner, “taking into account the need to earn your living”; 
2 The financial perceptions are responses to the question, “Taking into account the income that the members of your 
household receive from different sources, would you say that your household is financially well off, that you just 
manage or that you have difficulties”. The proportion of respondents indicating “difficulties” is not shown. It was 
under 10 per cent in all countries, except France, Greece, Portugal and Spain. 
Source: OECD, 2001, Employment Outlook 2001, Paris, Table 4.4, p. 138.  59 
 Table 2.5. Opinions on importance and availability of different options for combining 
paid and unpaid work, % working population, EU-15 2003 
 
Importance Available  Difference  important/ 
available 
Which of these options are important to you 




Men Women  Men  and 
Women 
Men and Women 
Working more or less hours if needed  59  58  60  44  14 
Saving up overtime to take as extra time off  38  38  39  29  10 
Carrying over holidays to next year  32  32  31  24    7 
Early retirement  25  27  23    9  16 
Taking extra paid time of to look after 
relatives 
25 22  28 12 12 
Early retirement but with the option of still 
working part-time 
24  23  25    7  17 
Taking extra pay instead of holiday  23  25  21  14    9 
Taking unpaid leave  21  20  22  19    2 
Taking extra paid time off for study  19  18  19  11    8 
Childcare facilities at your workplace  15 
 
11  21    4  11 
Teleworking  15  16  14    8    7 
Taking a sabbatical, career break  15  14  16    7    8 
Don’t know    7  47    6     
Others    4    4    4     
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   Men Women 


















-0.7  -5.5   6.3  -1.8  -1.9   3.7 
Belgium 1990-
2000 
-0.3  -1.8   2.0   0.9   2.1  -3.0 
Canada 1980-
2000 
-0.2  -3.1   3.3  -0.5  -1.9   2.4 
Denmark 1990-
2000 
 0.1  -7.1   7.1   2.6  -8.6   6.0 
Finland 1970-
2000 
 0.2  -3.9   3.8  -0.2  -2.7   2.9 
France 1970-
2000 
 0.8  -6.8   6.1  -1.6  -4.4   6.0 
Germany 1975-
2000 
 2.0  -6.5   4.6   0.2  -4.9   4.7 
Greece 1990-
2000 
 1.0  -1.0   0.0   1.3   0.4  -1.7 
Ireland 1985-
2000 
 0.6  -1.1   0.4   0.7  -3.5   2.8 
Japan 1970-
2000 
-0.3  -3.4   3.6   0.4  -3.8   3.4 
Luxembourg 1990-
2000 
 1.5  -4.6   3.1   7.0  -8.6   1.6 
Netherlands 1975-
2000 
-0.3  -2.1   2.4  -0.3  -3.2   3.5 
New Zealand  1990-
2000 
 0.2  -0.9   0.7   3.2  -5.7   2.5 
Portugal 1980-
2000 
 1.8  -5.6   3.8   0.1  -5.2   5.1 
Spain 1980-
2000 
 1.8  -4.4   2.6   1.7  -6.1   4.4 
Sweden 1970-
2000 
 0.2  -3.8   3.6  -2.9  -0.7   3.6 
Turkey 1995-
2000 





 0.3  -3.9   3.6  -2.5   0.6   1.9 
United States  1965-
2000 





 0.2  -3.3   3.1   0.0  -2.3   2.3 
 
1 Changes in lifetime allocation of labour and leisure across OECD-countries, normalised over (several periods) a ten 
years period. 
 
Source: Burniaux, J.M., R. Duval, and F. Jaumotte, 2004, ‘Coping with ageing: A dynamic approach to quantify 
the impact of alternative policy options on future labour supply in OECD Countries’, OECD Economics Department 
Working Paper Series, no. 371.  61 
Table 3.1. Public spending on families and on elderly, 1998
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spending on elderly 
(7) = ( 1):(4) 
Australia
  2.60  2.19 0.41    5.06  4.30 0.76  0.51 
Austria  3.03  1.92 1.11  10.86  9.94 0.92  0.28 
Belgium  2.22  2.06 0.16    7.50  7.37 0.13  0.30 
Canada  0.76  0.76     5.10  5.10   0.15 
Czech 
Republic 
1.61  1.61     6.85  6.37 0.48  0.24 
Denmark  3.77  1.54 2.23    9.77  6.82 2.95  0.39 
Finland  3.36  1.92 1.44    8.53  6.99 1.54  0.39 
France  2.69  1.46 1.23  11.25  10.59 0.66  0.24 
Germany  2.73  1.93 0.80  11.21  10.46 0.75  0.24 
Greece  1.91  1.18 0.73  10.49  10.22 0.27  0.18 
Ireland  1.74  1.58 0.16    2.90  2.54 0.36  0.60 
Italy  0.88  0.58 0.30  13.01  12.84 0.17  0.07 
Japan  0.47  0.21 0.26    5.98  5.67 0.31  0.08 
Luxembourg  2.81  2.40 0.41    8.53  8.02 0.51  0.33 
Netherlands  1.21  0.81 0.40    7.51  6.21 1.30  0.16 
New Zealand  2.65  2.55 0.10    5.47  5.47 0.00  0.48 
Poland  0.93  0.93     8.25  7.97 0.28  0.11 
Portugal  0.98  0.65 0.33    6.58  6.31 0.27  0.15 
Slovak 
Republic 
2.19  2.10 0.09    5.62  5.20 0.42  0.39 
Spain  0.40  0.29 0.11    8.41  8.12 0.29  0.05 
Sweden  3.31  1.63 1.68  11.17  7.46 3.71  0.30 
Turkey  0.98  0.91 0.07    4.31  4.22 0.09  0.23 
United 
Kingdom 
2.22  1.73 0.49  10.58  9.77 0.81  0.21 
United States  0.51  0.22 0.29    5.20  5.15 0.05  0.10 
 
1 Cash amount for a two-earner family with two children as a percentage of GDP. A blank means that there is no 
scheme; a ‘0.00’ means that a scheme exists but is not visible as a percentage of GDP.  
 
Source: Own calculations using the OECD Statistical database. 
 





Figure 2.1. Female labor force participation in percentages, 1980-2005 (persons aged 
15-64 years) 
 
Female labor force participation in percentages, 1980-2005




























































































































































































































































Source: OECD, 2002 & 2006, Employment Outlook 2002 & 2006, Paris, Statistical annex, Table B, p. 250. 
European Union Labor Force Survey. Before 1990: OECD, Labor Force Statistics.  63 
Figure 2.2. Female employment rates by educational attainment, 2004 ( persons aged 
25-64 years) 
 
Source: OECD, 2006, Employment Outlook 2006, Paris, Statistical annex, Table D, pp. 260-262. 
 
Female employment rates  by educational attainment, 2004





























































































































































































































































Less than upper secondary education Upper secondary education Tertiary education 64 
Figure 2.3. Life expectancy at 65, 1960-2002-2050 





































































































































































































Sources: OECD, 2005, Society at a Glance, Social indicators 2005 Edition, Paris; Eurostat Europop 2004, baseline;* 
=1970  65 
 Figure 2.4. Expected years in retirement
1, 1970 and 2004 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































1The data refer to life expectancy at the average effective age of retirement.
 
 
Source: OECD estimates. See also OECD, 2006, ‘Live longer, work longer,’ Paris,  p. 35.  66 
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Child/Education Working Life Retirement
 
 
1 Based on average expected ages of entry and exit in 2000. The three periods (child/education, working life and 
retirement) amount to 100. Countries are ordered in increasing life-time share of working life.  
 
Source: Burniaux, J.M., R. Duval, and F. Jaumotte, 2004, ‘Coping with ageing: A dynamic approach to quantify 
the impact of alternative policy options on future labour supply in OECD Countries’, Economics Department 
Working Paper Series, no. 371.  68 
Figure 2.6. Learning, working and resting years in the Netherlands, 1950-2002 
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Sources: OECD, 2005, Society at a Glance, Social Indicators 2005 Edition, Paris; CBS, 2004, Nederlanders 
zijn minder gaan werken (Dutch are working less and less), Voorburg.  69 
Figure 2.7. Age and household composition, 1996 
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Source: Kalle, P., E. Lambrechts, and P. Cuyvers, 2002, ‘Caring for the Next Generation. Family Life Cycle, 
Income and Fertility,’ European Commission Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs Study 
Series 2002, Brussels. 
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Figure 2.8. Age and standardized income, 1996 
 
 







































































Source: Kalle, P., E. Lambrechts, and P. Cuyvers, 2002, ‘Caring for the Next Generation. Family Life Cycle, 
Income and Fertility,’ European Commission Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs Study 
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Policies: An Issues Note
A.L. Bovenberg
Summary Findings
A number of trends are changing the nature of social risks and increase the
importance of human capital, adaptability and flexibility. This paper discusses
the usefulness of a life-course perspective in developing proactive social policies
that better fit the changing life cycles of individuals who combine formal work
with other activities on transitional labor markets. It pays special attention to
the accumulation and maintenance of human capital over the life course and
stresses that reconciliation of work and family goes beyond child-care facilities
and parental leave, and involves the entire life course. In particular, longer and
deeper involvement in paid employment allows people to exploit their longer
life to reconcile the two ambitions of, first, investing in the next generation as
a parent and, second, pursuing a fulfilling career in paid work in which one
keeps learning. Greater flexibility of working time over the life course requires
more individual responsibility for financing leave. Moreover, rather than
shielding older insiders through employment protection, labor-market institutions
should enable parents of young children to easily enter and remain in the labor
market. Finally, more activating social assistance and in-work benefits should
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